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At least half of American adults are overweight or obese, and the number may be as high as two-thirds.​[1]​  Overweight individuals face increased chances of cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, stroke, osteoarthritis, some types of cancer, and psychological disorders such as depression and low self-esteem.​[2]​  In 1999, overweight and obesity caused 280,000 excess deaths per year,​[3]​ and obesity may soon replace smoking as the primary cause of preventable death.​[4]​  The risks for communities are also high.  In 1999, obesity caused 4.3% of direct U.S. health care costs.​[5]​  If similar numbers still hold, that represents (very roughly) 51 billion dollars annually.​[6]​   
	These facts have spurred anti-obesity campaigns, and those campaigns have provoked difficult questions in public health and population ethics.  Should the government merely inform people about the risks of unhealthy food?  May it try to change behavior by taxing unhealthy food?  May it ban some foods outright?  
	This paper proposes that we should answer these questions using familiar liberal principles.  The principles show that several common arguments for obesity interventions are flawed.  The principles also highlight several that succeed, and those arguments point toward a new proposal for food labeling and some potential market interventions.




Liberalism is the view that liberty is of prime importance and the state needs strong justification for infringing upon it.  So described, liberalism is a vast tradition accepted by many classic figures—including Locke, Rousseau, and Mill—and developed by equally diverse modern figures—including Nozick, Rawls, and Dworkin.  Liberalism is also accepted by a vast number of people today, and on this score terms can be misleading.  In America “liberal” is usually contrasted with “conservative”, but on this paper’s definition, most conservatives are liberals as well.  Moreover, in Europe “liberalism” often denotes libertarianism of a fairly minimalist sort.  That is not the way the term is used here.  Instead this paper takes as its central tenet the liberal principle proposed by John Stuart Mill and refined by those who came after him:  

The state may interfere with a kind of action, A, if and only if the interference appropriately prevents, reduces, or stops individuals from (a) wrongly harming others, (b) wrongly offending others, or (c) harming themselves through actions that are substantially non-voluntary.

In order to flesh out the principle’s meaning, let us dissect it into component parts.​[9]​
	First, the principle says the state may sometimes stop an individual from wrongfully harming someone else.  An important qualification is that the harm must be wrongful.  For instance, if A makes a better widget than B, he may run B out of business and therefore do him harm.  But the harm is not wrongful, and so the state may not interfere.  It should also be noted that on the usual understanding of “wrongful harm”, one can wrongfully harm someone by failing to fulfill a positive duty to help the person improve their situation.  For instance, some liberals believe that we have extensive duties to redistribute our wealth to the worst-off, to help provide everyone with medical care, and so on.  (Some of the principal American exponents of liberalism are Rawls and Dworkin, and both advocate extensive redistribution.)  So while liberalism is often confused with right-wing libertarianism, liberalism does not rule out extensive positive duties.  
	Second, the principle says that the state may sometimes stop an individual from wrongfully offending someone else.  Since offense is not relevant to obesity, this will not be discussed further.  
	Third, the principle says that the state may sometimes engage in soft paternalism: it may stop individuals from harming themselves if the choices are substantially non-voluntary—i.e., if the choosers are not fully competent (e.g., children), if they are affected by coercion or duress, by subtle manipulation (e.g., post-hypnotic suggestion), if the choosers are significantly uninformed, or if they are affected by emotions that distort reasoning.  All choices are non-voluntary to some degree, and to be immune from government interference a choice only needs to be sufficiently voluntary.  The bar is set by the nature of the choice being made.  Small risks require less voluntariness; higher risks require more.  Furthermore, one of the most important implications of the liberal principle is that, while it countenances soft paternalism, it rules out hard paternalism that is intended to prevent people from harming themselves even when they have made a sufficiently voluntary choice.  
	The liberal principle sanctions state interference in these three cases, but only if the interference is appropriate.  This is a catch-all condition that rules out many things.  For instance, the appropriateness clause rules out state intervention that carries too great a cost to other values.  It also restricts the state to the least coercive action required for its purposes.  
	Why believe the liberal principle?  In On Liberty Mill argued that adopting (his version of) the liberal principle would limit governmental intrusion in our lives, thereby encouraging free thought, experimentation, individual development, and well-being.  These in turn would allow society to make the greatest amount of moral progress.​[10]​   Others have defended the liberal principle by appealing to a right to autonomy.  However, the most immediately forceful justification is that the liberal principle accords with our informed judgements about particular subjects.  Typical readers probably believe all of the following: the state should stop someone from battering you, it should not stop you from competing with someone else in business, it should prevent someone from standing in front of your house and yelling obscenities for hours on end, it should not stop you from protesting government policies in front of city hall, it should stop you from haplessly walking onto an unsafe bridge, it should not stop you from engaging in private sexual practices in your own bedroom.  All these things can be explained by liberalism.  Most readers of this paper already accept liberalism, whether they know its name or not.  
	Mill used the liberal principle to defend free speech and critique government intrusion into private lives.  But the principle also has implications for the obesity epidemic.  Obesity results from many factors, but one of the most important is the sale of unhealthy food from producers or distributors to consumers.  Those sales are interactions between two private parties, and to regulate them would be to regulate two people’s private interaction.  The liberal principle tells us whether that regulation is warranted.  
	The rest of the paper focuses solely on food sales to adult consumers, because children’s consumption raises special issues beyond the scope of this paper.​[11]​  Focusing on adults, let us first consider several liberal rationales for intervention.

Two Liberal Rationales for Obesity Intervention

The First Rationale: Prevention of Substantially Non-Voluntary Self-Harm

The liberal principle warrants obesity intervention because individuals are harming themselves in ways that are substantially non-voluntary.  Individuals clearly harm themselves by consuming too much unhealthy food.  Since overweight and obesity have severe risks, there should be a high threshold for sufficient voluntariness.  But the voluntariness of typical consumers is impaired because they have little knowledge of nutritional information, little ability to act on that information, and have been misled or left uninformed by advertising campaigns.​[12]​   
	To see the severity of these problems, consider the problems with our current system for communicating calorie content.  First, the information is not always available or easily available—e.g., for restaurant meals.​[13]​  Second, the information is often for serving sizes that are unrealistically small, and thus consumers must convert the information into something useful—e.g., multiplying 110 calories by 2.5 servings.  Such operations are demanding, because a significant portion of the American population is innumerate or has very low mathematical ability.​[14]​  Third, even if serving sizes were accurate, people would have to add up the calorie information of different items eaten at a meal—numbers such as 85, 130, 390, and 220.  This also places a burden on mathematically-challenged citizens.  Finally, even if all the operations could be performed, remembering calorie information throughout the day is not easy—e.g., that one ate 430 calories for breakfast, 780 for lunch, 135 for a mid-day snack, and 910 for dinner.  Such numbers are easily forgotten and for all practical purposes must be recorded each day.  
	Since our current system does not produce sufficiently voluntary consumption, further intervention is warranted under the liberal principle.  The obvious liberal solution is to provide consumers with better information.  More extensive steps are legitimate only if it is impractical to sufficiently inform the consumers.  Later sections will consider the specific policy proposals that might arise from this argument.  First the paper considers another liberal argument.

The Second Rationale: Just Markets

Many people live in areas that discourage a proper balance of calorie intake and energy expenditure.  Local jobs may be largely sedentary.  Urban areas may lack open areas for recreation or the areas may be unsafe.  Nutritional foods may be substantially more expensive than unhealthy ones, and they may be less convenient to buy.  Suburban and urban sprawl may require that individuals spend more time driving than walking or cycling.​[15]​  These facts suggest that individuals are in unjust circumstances and therefore intervention is warranted. ​[16]​  Put in the terms of this paper:  Each of us has a duty to help ensure that others live in just nutritional environments.  If the government does not intervene, just markets will not develop.  Thus government intervention is warranted to establish just markets.
	Because of space constraints, consider only claims about nutritional food.  One could defend the idea that the nutritional environment is unjust by appealing to a general and a specific claim.  The general claim is that a nutritional environment is unjust if people who make reasonable efforts to provide for themselves do not have the opportunity to pursue the fundamental good of health along with other aspects of a reasonable life-plan, even though the environment could be structured otherwise without imposing too greatly on the resources of others.  The specific claim is that some current nutritional environments do not meet these standards.
	The plausibility of the general claim can be established through thought experiments.  First, imagine a society in which the non-rich do not have the resources to pursue the fundamental good of nutritional health, but that this situation could be ameliorated by only a small imposition on the rich.  Most would believe this society to be unjust.  Moreover, a similar example can show something stronger: that a market is unjust, not only if it deprives people of nutritional health altogether, but forces them to choose between nutritional health and the other elements of a reasonable life-plan.  Imagine that there are jobs which pay highly enough to enable people to afford nutritional food, but they require such high hours that individuals could not simultaneously pursue the basic good of, say, friendship and family.  Moreover, imagine again that this problem can be corrected by only a small imposition on the rich.  Most would believe this society to be unjust, and this provides a prima facie case for our general moral claim.
	Now to the specific issue: according to these standards, are actual nutritional environments unjust?  A few clarifications are in order.
	The primary cause of overweight is the over-consumption of calories.  A just food market would therefore seem to be one in which people can purchase few enough calories at a reasonable price.  However, that seems perfectly possible.  Public-health experts often complain that calorie-dense foods (such as fast foods) are available at cheap prices.  And if so, then fewer calories must be available cheaply as well.  
	This reasoning might seem like sophistry, but the issue is real.  Any American can consume their daily allowance of calories at a reasonable price.  The injustice must lie elsewhere, and the strongest argument is that it lies in the prohibitive cost of food of appropriate calorie density.  Calorie density is average calories per unit of weight, and it is significant because individuals do not feel full merely because they eat a sufficient number of calories, but because they consume sufficient bulk.​[17]​  So if individuals are to both eat a proper number of calories and not crave food throughout the day, they need buy foods with low calorie density—salads, vegetables, fruits, and so on.  
	It is hard to determine whether people can buy low-calorie and non-dense foods at non-prohibitive prices.  Morally, one must set a standard of “non-prohibitiveness” by determining what constitutes a reasonable life-plan.  Factually, one must determine whether prices are non-prohibitive.
	And here this paper must leave off, because defining “reasonable life-plan” is a task beyond this paper’s scope, and because determining price levels is a factual issue best left to empirical scientists.  Still, there are two reasons for suspecting that food markets are unjust.  
	First, there are studies of particular nutritional environments,​[18]​ and these strongly suggest that nutritional food is often prohibitively expensive.  Second, even if nutritional food were suddenly as cheap as unhealthy food, food markets might still be unjust.  Our moral standard tells us that people who make an effort to support themselves should be able to pursue all elements of a reasonable life-plan, so long as granting them this opportunity does not impose too greatly on their fellow citizens.  Surely health care, nutrition, education, and decent family relationships are on the list of elements of any reasonable life-plan.  And yet there is reason to think that these elements are currently unavailable to poorer Americans, even when they opt for unhealthy food.  For instance, many poorer Americans cannot afford what many of us consider to be adequate health-care, even if they eat an unhealthy diet.​[19]​  And if that is so, then equalizing the price of healthy and unhealthy food will not suffice to meet our moral standard.  Instead greater changes are required.
	These are only guesses, though.  All that can be concluded is that if nutritional markets are unjust, then the government should correct them.

Rationales for Intervention that Fail

There are two liberal rationales for intervention in food transactions.  Later this paper will consider specific policies suggested by these rationales.  First, though, the paper rules out some other rationales that either fail or do not go beyond the conclusions already reached.
	
Third Rationale: Producers Harming Consumers

One rationale for intervention is that when producers sell unhealthy food, they wrongfully harm consumers.  This is plausible.  The sale of unhealthy food causes harm, and it can even seem plausible that selling patently unhealthy food is wrongful.  
	But this argument has a serious problem.  A long-standing principle of liberalism is ‘volenti non fit injuria’: people cannot be wronged by actions to which they consent.  If a patient asks a surgeon to remove his appendix, then, while the surgery is clearly “harm” in some sense, the patient cannot complain that it was battery.  Applied to the sale of unhealthy food, volenti tells us that if the consumer consented to the purchase, then the sale cannot be considered wrongful.
	The volenti response can seem definitive, but there is another complexity.  Volenti requires that the action be consented to with sufficient voluntariness.  And perhaps it was not.  As noted earlier, it is arguable that consumers act because of ignorance, misapprehensions, or outright lies.  
	However, even if the volenti response does not work, it does reveal that this argument will not justify interventions that are any different from those which are justified by the earlier argument from the need to prevent involuntary self-harm.  The only flaw found in food transactions is that consumers may not be acting in ways that are sufficiently voluntary, and that is the same problem that was found earlier.  

Fourth Rationale: Externalized Costs

Another rationale for intervention appeals to the need to prevent harm to others.  Suppose that some individuals voluntarily choose to eat unhealthy food and they become overweight or obese.  This process creates externalized costs for other people.  The consumers may seek treatment in a public health care system, and they may also seek treatment in private insurance plans, thereby raising premiums for the other members.  These externalized costs are large.  According to one estimate, half of obesity-related medical costs—perhaps 25.5 billion dollars​[20]​—are borne by Medicare and Medicaid.  Presumably the effects on insurance premiums are large as well.​[21]​  It could be argued that requiring third-parties to bear these costs is wrongful harm.​[22]​  
	To evaluate the last claim definitively, one would have to articulate the reason why we are obligated to help pay for anyone’s health care, then decide whether this rationale supported an exception for those who are voluntarily overweight.  That task is impossible in this limited space.  Instead this paper will discuss the argument that is the most prominent, meritorious, and intuitive. 
	The argument is well-described by Wikler and Beauchamp:

Those who believe that the welfare state should assist its citizens in meeting their basic needs…should not regard all needs as equal. Unhealthy lifestyles create avoidable needs, and individuals should be held responsible for these choices. Those who refuse to take care of themselves, in this view, forfeit at least some of the liberties (to individual choice) and the entitlements (to help, on an equal footing, in time of need) that others deserve.​[23]​

	The argument will not work as it stands.  By limiting care for voluntary and avoidable needs, it implies that public health care systems should not pay for, among other things, diseases contracted during foreign travel, injuries to seniors who fall during a ballroom dance class, or the medical costs of motorcycle accident victims – even if they were wearing helmets.  In fact, the argument seems to imply that public systems should not cover auto accidents of any sort, since automobile driving is avoidable and undertaken voluntarily.  What the argument needs is some other principled way of distinguishing between voluntary unhealthful eating and the other activities.
	And this is where the argument falters, because it is incredibly difficult to see how to make a principled distinction.​[24]​  Most people think public systems should bear the costs of dance injuries and travel diseases because they think dancing and travel are part of rational life-plans.  But a rational life-plan can also involve voluntarily eating unhealthy food.  
	To see this requires some theory of rational life-plans.  One theory is the corrected-preference theory: the right ends are those the individual would choose if he or she was rational, well-informed, and acquainted with the ends from which to choose.​[25]​  Rational and well-informed individuals seem to choose lives that involve eating unhealthy food to the point of being overweight or obese.  (Think of how often one sees an overweight doctor.)  So this is strong evidence that overeating can be part of a rational life-plan.  The principal rival theory is an objective list theory: certain ends are the right ones, perhaps including the end of avoiding overweight and obesity.  But while this theory may seem to contrast with the corrected-preference theory, the two are often quite similar.  This happens because any account of the human good that diverged too greatly from what rational, well-informed individuals favor would be regarded by most as implausible.  Since some rational, well-informed individuals favor being overweight, this is good evidence that the objective list does not exclude it.
	Public health experts often resist these conclusions, but their resistance rests on several interrelated errors:
	(1) Public health experts frequently assume that overweight or obese people make irrational decisions about food without providing any independent evidence that they are.  For instance, Peter Allmark points out that the British Government's report Choosing Health tended to use the terms “informed choice” and “healthy choice” interchangeably.  It also judged informational campaigns by whether they reduced obesity, thus assuming that informed individuals would necessarily cease overeating.​[26]​  
	(2) Moreover, when the experts do provide evidence, they often point out that current overeating is often the result of misinformation.  That is simply not relevant, because we have already acknowledged that information problems need to be corrected.  The question here is whether a health system should pay for the health costs of adequately informed people who elect to eat unhealthfully.      
	(3) Public health experts often assume that overweight people make irrational decisions because the experts fall into the idea that overeating is sinful, gluttonous, or otherwise something people should be averse to.​[27]​  They provide no evidence for this idea, and the idea is removed from most modern conceptions and many older ones.​[28]​  
	(4) Individuals in the medical profession often see health as one of the supreme goods, assuming that rational individuals will seek it at great expense.​[29]​  But this flies in the face of experience.  People regularly trade health for other things in all areas of life.  They do so when they elect to work in higher-paying jobs near dangerous chemicals, in sedentary jobs offering no exercise, and even when they elect to work in hospitals—work that increases the risk of disease.  Most readers of this paper probably accept the risk of colon cancer in exchange for the pleasure of red meat.​[30]​  In like manner, some people might simply love delicious foods more than the chance at a few additional years of healthy life.
	So in sum, there is evidence that rational, well-informed individuals sometimes elect to eat to the point of being overweight, and the contrary arguments are fallacious.  This suggests that if informed people chose to overeat to the point of being overweight, that could be part of a rational life-plan.  Moreover, since by the rationale’s own lights, it is not wrong for public health plans to help pay for care that results from a rational life-plan, there are no grounds on which to say that these externalized costs constitute wrongful harm to others.

Fifth Rationale: Hard Paternalism

Hard paternalism seems to lie behind some proposed obesity interventions, including taxes on unhealthy food that are aimed at discouraging consumption.  As noted above, hard paternalism is straightforwardly incompatible with liberalism.  But while the hard paternalist argument fails from the start, there are a few complexities worth noting.  
	First, some people might think that taxes on unhealthy food are justified because unhealthy food produces externalized costs.  This is an attempt to transform the hard paternalist argument into something like the argument from externalized costs given above.  




Several rationales for intervention fail, but two arguments succeed.  This paper now asks about the specific interventions warranted by these arguments.  

The First Step: Food Labeling

Consider the argument that appeals to the need to prevent involuntary self-harm.  The least intrusive (and therefore best) intervention would be an information system that adequately informs consumers about the principal risk of unhealthy food: weight gain and the attendant medical problems.  Adequately informing people about this particular risk principally requires communicating basic calorie information.​[32]​  In addition, any information system must correct the defects in our current system.  It must provide ubiquitous information.  It must employ realistic serving sizes.  It must minimize mathematical burdens.  It must allow consumers to easily track their calorie intake.
	(It is assumed here that a system of information that meets these goals would not only make information available in some bare sense, but also ensure that: [a] almost anyone who chooses not to take in the information does so on the basis of a sufficiently voluntary choice, and [b] those who choose to try to take in the information would have an acceptable level of comprehension.  Whether this is so is [partly] an empirical question that cannot be dealt with in this paper.)  
	Here is one proposal for reaching these goals.  The first can be reached by giving all foodstuffs clear and accessible labels, including labels on restaurant menus.  The second goal can be partly reached by using more realistic serving sizes, a process the FDA has already begun.​[33]​ Even if serving sizes are more realistic, individuals may still eat more than one and challenging mathematics may still be required.  For that reason the second goal, as well as the third and fourth, can be promoted by ceasing to use calorie information and instead using a “point system” which converts calorie information into smaller numbers.  Specifically, every 50 calories would be labeled as one-half a point, with fractions being rounded using standard techniques.  Thus a 100-calorie food would be labeled as 1 point, a 230 calorie food as 2 ½, and a 520-food as 5.  One could recommend 20 points per day for a typical woman and 25 per day for a typical man if one wants to accept the corresponding 2000- and 2500-calorie averages.  These points could be more easily remembered and recorded.  A point system would also radically reduce the mathematical demands on consumers, with most calculations requiring only simple addition by ones and halves.  
	The advantages of a point system are easiest to see if one imagines the experience of a typical consumer.  The consumer enters a McDonald’s and sees that a quarter-pounder contains 4 points, a medium fries 4 points, and a diet coke 0 points.​[34]​  She knows the meal will use 8 of her 20 points for the day—all without substantial calculation.  The 8 is easily remembered and added to the 5 she consumed for breakfast.  She knows that if she eats the meal at McDonald’s she will have consumed 13 of her 20 points and will have 7 left for dinner.  
	The basic advantages of the point system are clear.  But would it render consumption sufficiently voluntary?  To answer one must know the concrete results of the proposal (the empirical facts) and whether those results make individual choices “sufficiently voluntary” (a philosophical fact).
	The empirical facts can only be definitively known after empirical study.  One would need to test or enact the point system, then measure various empirical outcomes—whether people understand the system, whether the mathematics is still too complex, etc.  The best that can be said for the proposal—or any untested proposal—is that it is designed to respond to known problems in ways that seem reasonable.
	Now for the philosophical question: would the information provided by the point system make consumption “sufficiently voluntary”?  Consuming unhealthy foods causes serious medical problems and shortens lives, so a high level of voluntariness should be required.  Moreover, greater voluntariness is required when the action is irrevocable,​[35]​ and while some effects of unhealthy food can be counter-acted, unhealthful eating can lead to life-long problems.  For this reason there should be a high standard of voluntariness.  
	Voluntariness can be impaired in many ways:​[36]​ because individuals lack fully rational capacities (e.g., because they are children), because they are coerced, because they experience temporarily distorting circumstances (e.g., strong emotions or the effects of narcotics), because they are manipulated (e.g., subliminal suggestion), and because they are ignorant or acting under mistaken beliefs.  The first two are not relevant.  However, objectors might contend (1) that people are too ignorant, because the point system does not adequately inform them, (2) that they are manipulated by the claims of advertisers, or (3) that their rational decision-making is overwhelmed by the desire for unhealthy food.
	(1) Consider ignorance.  The point system adequately informs people about calorie content, so the objection must be that other information is missing.  To focus the discussion, this paper will assume that the objection is that the point system does not communicate some of the information standardly included on food labels (and therefore standardly considered important): calories from fat; nutrients such as cholesterol, sodium, fiber, sugar, and protein; and vitamin and mineral content.
	(Another objection might be that consumers are ignorant of the outcomes of overeating.  But while consumers do not have perfect information, they do have enough information to make their choices sufficiently voluntary.  Compare the information they have about other health risks we allow, such as cigarette smoking, bicycling in the street, and so on.)
	Of the standard candidates, the most relevant to obesity is fat content.​[37]​  But there are two reasons that choices can be sufficiently voluntary even without fat content.  One is that information about fat content is implicitly included in calorie information.  For instance, consumers can guess that of an average sized pasta dish contains 10 points (1000 calories), it has high fat content.  Another is that, on the assumption that consumers have adequate calorie information, the marginal value of additional information about fat may be low enough that a choice can be sufficiently voluntary without it.
	These replies are not definitive as they stand, but even if they ultimately fail, the objection would not refute the basic idea that proper labeling can produce sufficiently voluntary choice.  Instead they merely indicate that the point system must be augmented with a similar, simplified system that communicates fat content.
	(2) A more serious objection is that, even if the point system adequately informs people, their actions are still not sufficiently voluntary because they are subject to the distorting influences of advertising.
	One response would be to claim that advertising has only minimal effects on consumer rationality.  Such claims are often made by advertisers defending their industry.​[38]​  Those claims are suspect; instead there is good evidence that advertising can distort consumer rationality.​[39]​  Therefore, some might feel that the point system must be augmented by regulation of food advertising.  
	Perhaps advertising of all sorts should be regulated.  That is a vast topic, though, and most people would say that even if restrictions on advertising would increase the voluntariness of food choice, they would violate the liberal requirement that all interventions be “appropriate”, because regulation on advertising involves too great a cost to other values -- in particular, the value of free commercial speech.
	No matter who is right, the objection fails for another reason.  While advertising reduces voluntariness, it does not reduce it to such a great extent that food choices are no longer sufficiently voluntary.  Compare food markets and markets in other goods.  The manufacturers of cars, for instance, employ the same advertising techniques that food manufacturers do.  Moreover, incorrect car choices can have significant ramifications for fundamental goods.  Not only is driving a car enormously dangerous, but purchasing a car that is, say, too expensive can have significant effects on one's life and the life of one's family.  And yet the market in cars is generally regarded as a reasonable one.  Similarly, though advertising distorts the market for foodstuffs, its distortions do not seem so great that they render individual choices insufficiently voluntary.
	In essence, the point is that when evaluating the voluntariness of health-related choices, one not impose a standard that is out of line with the standards all of us employ and accept in everyday life.  True, food producers engage in indifferent, reckless, and often malicious advertising campaigns.  But as the above comparison makes clear, it is normally assumed that we can make responsible choices even in the face of extensive business propaganda.	
	(3)  A final objection to the point system is that, even if it informs people, their reasoning will still be distorted by the overwhelming temptation of unhealthy food.  But while unhealthy food is tempting, it does not seem so tempting that it renders choices substantially non-voluntary.  Compare other decisions typically made.  Without regulation (of the sort under discussion here), our society sells all sorts of products that people find tempting: fancy electronics, video games, pornography, cute and fashionable shoes, eBay items whose auctions are about to close—even the last book of Harry Potter, which many people felt compelled to buy in hard cover the day it came out, despite the high price.  Since people can reasonably manage their temptations toward these and other products, the temptations of unhealthy food do not seem to render decisions about it substantially nonvoluntary.
	(Here it is assumed that most people are not addicted to food, although it should be acknowledged that this is an empirical claim that might be proven false.  It is also worth noting that some strong form of addiction would be required to override the presumption in favor of individual choice.  Caffeine is to some extent addictive, but very few people regard the open market in coffee as one that individuals cannot manage through voluntary choice.)
	With these objections out of the way, the paper has shown that if one appeals to the need to prevent self-harm, the first option should be to use a point system or some other numerically simple system of information.  But now let us ask whether further interventions can be justified by the need to create just markets.

Further Interventions?  Unjust Markets

The argument from unjust markets is an independent rationale for government intervention.  It is possible, though, that the point system would again constitute the needed intervention.  Perhaps the point system would alter consumer behavior, thereby altering the behavior of producers and producing just markets.  The only way to know is by trying the point system and measuring the effects.
	That is an important point.  Because an informational system is the least intrusive intervention, the right course of action is to begin with a point system, study its effects, and only then undertake further interventions.  That is not the current practice in the United States.  Instead, we are undertaking obesity interventions even though we have not tried less intrusive measures first.
	Suppose, though, that the point system did not produce a just market.  What economic policies would?  This is again an empirical question to be settled by policy experts, not philosophers.  However, one philosophical observation should constrain the work of the experts.
	Public health officials often misunderstand the requirements of just markets, and thus their proposals are inappropriate.  Consider one example, the costs of food.  Public health experts often suggest taxing unhealthy food in order to discourage consumers from unhealthy lifestyles.  However, the problem is not that healthy foods are more expensive than unhealthy ones.  After all, imagine that all consumers had the buying power of the upper middle class.  Such people can afford to buy healthy foods at current prices, and in light of this, it is no injustice that unhealthy food is even cheaper.​[40]​  This fact is implicitly acknowledged by public health experts, who almost always focus their criticisms on the state of the poor.  Instead the injustice of current food markets is that poor people cannot buy healthy food at non-prohibitive prices.  Such injustices are not corrected by merely increasing the price of unhealthy food, even if that leads consumers to buy more healthful food.  The right policies are more likely to involve redistributing income so that healthful food is affordable, or subsidizing the sale of unhealthy food when necessary.  

Conclusions, and General Reflections on Liberalism in Public Health

This paper has taken our well-established liberal principles and applied them to the obesity epidemic.  This is significant for several reasons.  
	Some are concrete.  Our current system of communicating calorie information will not make food choice sufficiently voluntary, because the system places too many demands on average citizens.  A better system, the point system, was proposed.  This system is likely to produce sufficiently voluntary consumption, and thus no other interventions are likely to be warranted to correct the ignorance or misunderstandings of the consumer.  If the food market were shown to be unjust, further interventions might be in order.  This is a promising line of reasoning, although the interventions it justifies would be different from some that are recommended by public health experts.  
	Another important upshot is that the paper shows how familiar, liberal principles can serve as a general framework for making public health decisions.  This is needed, since public health ethics is almost non-existent.  
	Of course, this paper has not argued that liberal principles should be applied to public health ethics; instead it has merely shown how it can be done.  To argue more thoroughly is beyond the scope of this paper, but here is a sketch of how one might defend a liberal approach to public health ethics.​[41]​
	To understand the justification for a liberal approach, one must first understand liberalism itself.  On this point the public health literature is often confused.  Liberalism is sometimes equated with right-wing libertarianism, with the associated ideas that people need not make sacrifices for the good of others.  Perhaps this is why some in public health are opposed to liberalism; they think its implications are too radical and implausible.  But liberalism is not libertarianism.  As argued above, liberalism can justify many kinds of government intervention, including intervention into unjust markets, perhaps up to the point of large-scale redistribution.
	Once liberalism is understood, one can see the enormous role it already plays in our lives.  The introduction noted that liberalism has enormous explanatory power.  Most of us use it to defend fundamental rights that we hold dear, including rights to free speech and rights to be free from government intervention in our private lives.  
	But why apply liberal principles to public health?  Liberal principles govern interactions between private parties.  Food sales are examples of such interactions, so assuming that we accept liberalism when discussing topics such as freedom of speech, it seems we should apply liberal principles to public health—QED.
	This reasoning is not definitive, though.  Many who write on public health ethics will say that, because of the special issues that come up in public health, one cannot draw useful analogies between public health issues and issues such as free speech and standard market transactions.  More generally, it is common to find public health experts saying that the general principles accepted in political debate do not apply to public health.​[42]​  In fact, they often claim that the general principles accepted in bioethics do not apply to public health.​[43]​
	There is nothing wrong with this reply in principle.  The details of issues make a difference, and it could turn out that the interactions between a food producer and a food consumer are importantly different from the interactions between, say, the producers of DVD players and their consumers.  But one cannot give up consistency altogether.  The cases must be shown to be different, and if they cannot be, then consistency demands that we treat them alike.  At several points, this paper has contended that the interactions between food producers and consumers are not importantly different from other cases that we regulate using liberal principles.  Thus liberal principles should be applied as we grapple with the obesity epidemic.
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